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Enterprise risk management (ERM) encompasses the spectrum of identifying and analyzing risk from 
an integrated, company-wide perspective in a structured and disciplined approach in aligning strategy, 
processes, people, technology and knowledge with a purpose of evaluating and managing the 
uncertainties facing the enterprise as it creates value. ERM essentially lays concern for managing the 
firm’s idiosyncratic risks apart from the systematic risks. However, the neo-classical finance theory 
(NCFT) postulates that managing the firm’s idiosyncratic risks is irrelevant. ERM implementation 
framework embraces the active management of the firm’s three classes of unsystematic risk, namely 
tactical risk, strategic risk and normative risk. This paper aims to provide a critical review of literature 
on the notion of managing firms’ unsystematic (specific) risk via an ERM implementation framework 
that leads to the enhancement of shareholders’ value. The mechanism through which the firms’ value 
enhancement is supposed to take place is theorized by a strategic conceptualization of risk premium 
model. 
 





The frequent occurrence of corporate financial reporting 
scandals of late has emerged enterprise risk 
management or ERM as a new paradigm for managing 
the portfolio of risks facing organizations. It offers a new 
mechanism which focuses on the improvement of 
corporate governance and the larger oversight on key 
risks to ensure that stakeholder value is enhanced and 
well preserved (Beasley et al., 2005; Walker et al., 2002).    
Numerous regulatory reforms have globally contributed 
to the growth of ERM deployment. In the U.S. for 
example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX 2002) 
has significantly extended public policies related to 
effective corporate governance and risk management. 
The recent amendments in the New York Stock 
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the inclusion of specific requirements for NYSE registrant 
audit committees to shoulder explicit responsibilities with 
respect to “risk assessment and risk management”. 
These responsibilities include the assessment and 
management of risks that are beyond financial reporting 
(Beasley et al., 2005; NYSE, 2003).  
In a similar development, the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) in 
September 2004 had issued the enterprise risk 
management-integrated framework to provide a model 
framework for ERM. The COSO’s framework defines 
ERM as follows: A process, effected by an entity’s board 
of directors, management and other personnel, applied in 
strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to 
identify potential events that may affect the entity, and 
manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide  
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of 
entity objectives (COSO, 2004).     






the firm’s three classes of unsystematic risk, namely, 
tactical risk, strategic risk, and normative risk. It functions 
within a conceptual framework to theoretically harness 
the positive dynamics of the causal relationships of the 
risks that are strategically associated with the firm’s 
business performance and the cost of capital. The 
implementation model’s focus on managing the firm’s 
idiosyncratic risk, apart from those of systematic risks, is 
nonetheless at odds with the neo-classical finance theory 
(NCFT) which postulates that managing the firm’s 
idiosyncratic risk is irrelevant. Hence, the objective of this 
paper is to critically review the scarce literature on the 
efficacy of ERM towards the cost of capital and its value 
creating mechanism from the perspective of shareholders 





Neo-classical financial theory and modern portfolio 
theory 
 
Classical finance theory (CFT) advocates two primary 
risk management tools for investors in their wealth 
investment, namely, diversification and asset allocation. 
These two concepts of investors’ risk management tools 
were first studied and popularized by Harry Markowitz 
(Belmont, 2004). Harry Markowitz in 1952 extended his 
work by introducing a model of portfolio theory. He 
theorized a relationship between risk and return. 
Markowitz’s model of portfolio theory emphasizes on risk 
return trade-off in terms of mean-variance efficient 
portfolio, hence the introduction of the efficient frontier of 
various assets combination and weight. An efficient 
frontier of an investment domain represents a set of 
“efficient portfolios” that maximizes expected returns at a 
given level of portfolio risk, or that minimizes portfolio risk 
for a given expected return (Belmont, 2004).  
Neo-classical financial theory (NCFT) applies these two 
powerful options of diversification and asset allocation 
and came up with modern portfolio theory (MPT) and 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM). NCFT however 
postulates that any internal risk management effort 
undertaken by the firm to reduce its idiosyncratic (firm-
specific) risk will be of no value to shareholders because 
shareholders can easily employ the mentioned two risk 
management options and arguably at a cheaper cost, to 
attain the same purpose and effect through building an 
investment portfolios. This argument holds true unless 
firm-specific risk management can prove to result in the 
increase of the present value of the firm’s cash flow. As 
such, internal risk management by the firm should focus 
only on reducing its systematic risk by such ways of 
hedging or buying insurance (Belmont, 2004). This 
conclusion of NCFT somehow runs counter to the initial 
value proposition of  corporate  risk  management  by  the  




CFT. For instance, Markowitz’s model of portfolio theory 
would suggest that if managers could find ways to 
minimize the firm’s cash flows volatility, or “total risk”, 
then they could create value for shareholders as long as 
the stabilized cash flows would not come at the expense 
of their expected value. NCFT such as CAPM, which 
extended Markowitz’s portfolio theory, demonstrated that 
in equilibrium, the “market portfolio” is the only one 
efficient portfolio that applies to all investors, regardless 
of their risk preferences. Hence, therein gives rise to the 
notion of beta. Thus, according to CAPM, beta risk is the 
only risk that investors should be concerned about in 
equilibrium (Chatterjee et al., 1999).     
Notwithstanding so, according to another school of 
thought such as the classic efficient market theory, even 
the management of systematic risk is futile. The 
argument is that it will not add value to shareholders 
since the costs of such activities like hedging and buying 
insurance policies will completely offset the value of 
eliminating such systematic risk. Hence, a zero sum 
game ensued for shareholders (Belmont, 2004; Doherty, 
2000).        
 
 
Capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
 
Systematic risk versus idiosyncratic risk  
 
Treynor (1961), Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) 
introduced capital asset pricing model (CAPM) by using 
the concepts of diversification and asset allocation, 
coupled with the modern portfolio theory as building 
blocks (Belmont, 2004; Bettis, 1983). Variables that are 
involved in CAPM’s formulation are systematic risk, 
specific risk (idiosyncratic risk), beta, and risk premium. 
Core to CAPM’s notion is the division of a security’s total 
risk into two parts, namely the systematic risk (also called 
market risk) and the idiosyncratic risk (also called firm-
specific or unique risk). CAPM explains systematic risk as 
the component of an asset’s price variance that is 
affected by the movement of the general market. It is also 
referred to as market risk. The covariance of the market 
and the asset’s price movements is measured by a 
coefficient called beta (). Thus, systematic risk is the 
risk of holding the market portfolio (Belmont, 2004). 
Idiosyncratic risk of an asset, on the other hand, is the 
other component of the asset’s price variance that is 
unique to itself and has no correlation to the general 
market movement. This element of idiosyncratic risk can 
be eliminated through diversification within an asset class. 
Systematic risk, however, cannot be diversified away. 
Nevertheless, it can be hedged. According to CAPM, the 
marketplace is efficient and compensates investors for 
taking systematic risk. Exposure to idiosyncratic risk will 
not be compensated because CAPM expects investors to 
diversify that risk away without reducing returns and at no  
  




cost in their portfolios’ asset class (Belmont, 2004). The 
expected return of an asset (portfolio) under CAPM is 
given by: 
 
E(Ri) = Rf + mi [ E(Rm) - Rf ] 
 
Where E(Ri) is the expected return on asseti; Rf is the 
return on a risk-free asset;  mi measures the covariance 
of asseti’s return to that of the market;  E(Rm) is the 
expected return on the market. Since  (beta) measures 
the sensitivity of an investment’s return to movements of 
the entire market, stocks with a beta of less than 1 will be 
less risky than the market whilst those with a beta greater 
than 1 will be more risky than the market (Bettis, 1983). 
In the CAPM formula term, the product of mi [ E(Rm) - 
Rf ] represents risk premium for stock i. In other words, it 
is the compensation for the stock’s exposure to the 
systematic risk. CAPM’s assumptions are: 
 
i. There are no taxes or transaction costs. 
ii. All investors have identical investment horizons. 
iii. All investors have identical perceptions regarding the 
expected returns, volatilities and correlations of available 
risky investments. 
 
In the context of NCFT’s uniform assumptions of such a 
simple world (that is, perfect and complete markets), 
Tobin’s (1958) saw a super-efficient portfolio as repre-
sented by the market portfolio. Bettis (1983) pointed out 
that although CAPM’s equation is explained in terms of 
stock returns, it has a parallel implication in capital 
budgeting situations in that: 
 
r = Rf + (project beta) (Rm – Rf)   
 
where r is the required rate of return on the project. 
Hence, the required rate of return on a project increases 
in tandem with the project’s beta. It then follows that the 
true cost of capital is influenced by the risk profile of the 
project for which the capital is put to use (Bettis, 1983).  
 
 
Critics of capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
 
CAPM has been subjected to many challenges ranging 
from its simplistic assumptions to the predictive ability of 
beta; hence its theoretical veracity has been critically 
questioned (Lusk et al., 2008; Fama and French, 2004; 
Chatterjee et al., 1999). Many scholars such as 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Stein (1988, 1989) 
rejected CAPM’s perfect market assumption citing 
information asymmetries that exist in the markets. These 
informational asymmetries have created principal-agent 
problems which prompted agency theorists championing 
the setting up of a proper governance mechanism within 





French (2004) described the version of CAPM developed 




Unsystematic risk and risk premium 
 
CAPM’s theoretical framework implies that there is no 
favorable risk pricing effect for any deliberate effort on the 
part of the firms to manage and reduce their unsyste-
matic risks. However, assuming there was a significant 
positive impact on managing unsystematic risk and the 
effect shall be captured in a risk pricing formula, how 
should the variables in the asset pricing model such as 
CAPM change?  
In Equation 1, it should follow that variable r, 
representing the required rate of return for an asset or a 
project, should be reduced due to the lower risk profile 
(either perceived or otherwise). A lowered r, which is also 
used for discounting firms’ expected cash flows, should 
yield a higher firm value as follows: 
 
Firm value =  E(CFt) / (1 + rt) t             ----  (1) 
 
Where  E(CFt) is the sum of all expected cash flows, t 
is the time period, and r is the discount rate. And 
according to NCFT, on the basis of maximizing 
shareholders’ wealth, the appropriate firm-decision rule is 
for managers to pursue all investment opportunities that 
will yield a positive net present value (NPV) (Belmont, 
2004). 
In the CAPM’s formula E(r) = Rf + mi [ E(Rm) - Rf ], 
where Rf is the risk free rate, mi is the firm’s (asset) beta 
or the correlation coefficient of that particular firm to the 
market portfolio. The term [ E(Rm) - Rf ] is the market 
potfolio’s risk premium and the term mi [ E(Rm) - Rf ] is 
the firm’s risk premium. The reduction of expected or 
required rate of return, E(r), will be significantly influenced 
by the firm’s risk premium term, or mi [ E(Rm) - Rf ]. The 
return on a risk-free asset (Rf) and the expected return on 
the market [ E(Rm) ] are exogenous variables and 
externalities to the firm where effectively there is nothing 
much managers can do to influence them managerially 
other than to hope for market forces to change in the 
favorable direction for the overall risk pricing reduction. 
The same applies to the firm’s beta (mi). Beta measures 
the covariance of the firm’s return to that of the market 
portfolio, in other words, it is the measurement for the 
firm’s systematic risk. The only way the beta of the firm 
will change is by way of the firm varying its existing 
business line so that its business risk profile relative to 
that of the market shifts. One example of this is to initiate 
business diversification through either the firm’s product 
lines or target markets. But this managerial maneuvering 
involves the systematic risk dimension of the firm. As 






the firm’s unsystematic risk and to reflect it in the CAPM 
equation, we need to include an additional variable that is, 
3, to effect the impact of the firm’s risk premium term. 
This variable should present in negative value so that it 
can have diminishing effect on the term mi [ E(Rm) - Rf ] 
such that the new risk premium term of the firm becomes 

m
i [ E(Rm) - Rf ] - 3. Thus, the modified CAPM formula 
that recognizes the effect of managing a firm’s 
unsystematic risk shall take the form of: 
 
E(Ri) = Rf + mi [ E(Rm) - Rf ] - 3            ---- (2) 
 
Conceptually, it should be noted in the Equation 2 that 
the effect of unsystematic risk does not appear in the 
form of a direct reward for bearing them in the way similar 
to bearing systematic risk in the asset pricing model. 
Rather, the reward is derived from its successful 
reduction or elimination. The inclusion of the term -3 in 
Equation 2 suggests that the firms are to be rewarded for 
their ability to reduce those unique risks that they face. 
The rationale for this reward is by giving the recognition 
that investors are not always able to hold a fully 
diversified portfolio such as that of market portfolio and 
that managing unsystematic risk can result in the firms 
enhancing their capability to improve earnings. This 
earnings improvement can come in the form of reducing 
or eliminating negative profit variation, reducing cost of 
financial distress, lowering firms’ risk premium and tax 
burdens, minimizing agency problem, avoiding costly 
external financing, enhancing corporate brand name and 
the likes (Dionne and Garand, 2000; Doherty, 2000b; 
Cummins and Smith, 1998; Stulz, 1996; Tufano, 1996; 
Froot et al., 1993). Managers, thus, should endeavor to 
manage firms’ unsystematic risk well enough to earn the 
largest possible value of  -3 as possible from the 
investors in order to reduce the firms’ required rate of 
return (risk premium) or cost of capital.   
In the context of asset pricing modeling, the notion for 
managing firms’ unsystematic risk can be derived from 
the hypothesis that investors would welcome such a 
reduction in idiosyncratic risks by the firm. As a result, 
investors would demand a relatively lower risk premium 
for their investment in the firm and this hypothesis is 
represented by the term -3 as in Equation 2. 
Nonetheless, great challenge remains in quantitatively 
measuring the variable 3 for the firms’ valuation in 
managing the firm’s idiosyncratic risk. This shall remain 
an important area for future research.  
 
 
ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 
IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK 
 
Managing risk individually vis-à-vis integrated 
approach 
 
Risk management has traditionally been practiced to 
merely comply with the  many  new  rules  and  regulation  




because risk is typically seen as a negative element and 
is to be avoided. Due to this reason, risk is often being 
addressed in silo. However, a strategic view should treat 
risk management process to improve the linkage 
between risk and opportunity so as to position it as a 
source of competitive advantage for the organization. Its 
approach should be positive and proactive, value-based, 
broadly focused and should be lined up with corporate 
strategies, objectives and goals (IAAS, 2008; Bierc, 2003; 
Meagher and O’Neil, 2000).  
 
 
The operational definition   
 
Chapman (2003) defined ERM as the process of iden-
tifying and analyzing risk from an integrated, company-
wide perspective. Meagher and O’Neil (2000) on the 
other hand, described it as a structured and disciplined 
approach in aligning strategy, processes, people, 
technology and knowledge with a purpose of evaluating 
and managing the uncertainties the enterprise faces as it 
creates value. Stoke (2004) viewed ERM to become an 
essential element of modern business as the focus for 
corporate risk management is shifting from operational 
hazards and pure financial risks to a much more strategic 
view of threats to business success and an appetite for 
upside risk. Stoke added that by combining this with a 
more holistic, top-down approach to risk strategy and 
appetite, companies can focus their attention on most 
significant threats to business objectives and achieve 
even greater value from risk management. Liebenberg 
and Hoyt (2003) concurred that unlike the traditional “silo-
based” approach to corporate risk management, ERM 
enables firms to benefit from an integrated approach in 
managing risk that shifts the focus of risk management 
function from primarily defensive to increasingly offensive 
and strategic.  
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission’s (COSO) ERM’s model consists 
of 8 components: internal environment, objective setting, 
event identification, risk assessment, risk response, 
control activities, information and communication and 
monitoring (COSO, 2004; Chapman, 2003). In com-
parison, the Arthur Andersen Business Risk Management 
Process (BRMP) develops a risk management framework 
that comprises 7 elements: (i) establish the business risk 
management process, (ii) assess business risks, (iii) 
develop business risk management strategies, (iv) 
design/implement risk management capabilities, (v) monitor 
risk management performance, (vi) continuously improve 
risk management capabilities, (vii) information for 
decision making (Meagher and O’Neil, 2000). 
To ensure successful enterprise-wide risk management 
process implementation, Meagher and O’Neil (2000) 
emphasized the following 4 dimensions: (i) moving away 
from fragmented approach, towards an integrated and 
systematic   framework  that  gives  credibility  to  the  risk  
  




management role within the business; (ii) identifying risk 
management goals and linking them to enterprise’s 
strategies; (iii) delegating responsibility for risks and 
making managers accountable to the board for 
continuously improving the management of those risks; 
(iv) do not only manage individual risks, but be able to 
systematically pool them and assess risk as a portfolio for 
the enterprise as a whole.     
In comparison to the old silo-approach of risk 
management, ERM proponents argue that an integrated 
approach of risk management increases firm value by 
reducing inefficiencies inherent in the traditional 
approach, improving capital efficiency, stabilizing 
earnings and reducing the expected costs of external 
capital and regulatory scrutiny (Liebenberg and Hoyt, 
2003). Bierc (2003) argued that a strategic risk 
management framework such as ERM should be 
developed and pursued with substantial regard to the key 
drivers that would impact success and value of a 
corporation. It should keep an organization focused on 
the things that drive success as well as provide the tools 
that can effectively measure organizational execution. 
In a nutshell, an ERM initiative typically encompasses 
the following activities: (i) articulating and communicating 
the objectives of the organization, (ii) determining the risk 
appetite of the organization, (iii) establishing an appro-
priate internal environment, including a risk management 
framework, (iv) identifying potential threats to the 
achievement of the objectives, (v) assessing the risk that 
is, the impact and likelihood of the threat occurring, (vi) 
selecting and implementing responses to the risks, (vii) 
undertaking control and other response activities, (viii) 
communicating information on risks in a consistent 
manner at all levels in the organization, (ix) centrally 
monitoring and coordinating the risk management 
processes and the outcomes, (x) providing assurance on 
the effectiveness with which risks are managed. 
 
 
ERM VALUE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM AND THE 
COST OF CAPITAL 
 
A strategic conceptualization of risk premium 
 
Traditionally, corporate risk management aims to 
minimize financial losses and maximize financial oppor-
tunities facing organizations by incorporating a logical 
and systematic method of establishing the context, 
identifying, analyzing, evaluating, mitigating, monitoring 
and communicating risk associated with any financial 
activity (Belmont, 2004). ERM’s framework establishes 
additional goals of dealing with all business activities to 
minimize/maximize other aspect of business losses/ 
opportunities such as reputation, branding, governance, 
and corporate entrepreneurship, to name a few. Contrary 





managing unsystematic risk with the belief that it will lead 
to an enhanced shareholders’ value. This concept blends 
well with the value-enhancing notion of corporate risk 
management as postulated by strategy theory.  
To support this shareholders’ value enhancing notion of 
managing the firm’s idiosyncratic risk via ERM framework, 
it is theorized that the value transmission mechanism to 
take place through the strategic conceptualization of the 
firm’s risk premium. This strategic risk premium model 
shall capture the causal relationships of the idiosyncratic 
risks that are strategically associated with firm 
performance.  
Chatterjee et al. (1999) postulated that investors are 
exposed to various classes of firm-specific risk in a world 
of partial diversification and imperfect markets. Chatterjee 
et al. (1999) conceptualized that there are dynamic rela-
tionships between three classes of firm’s unsystematic 
risk (that is, tactical, strategic and normative risks) and 
the firm’s risk premium. Tactical risk exists mainly in 
information asymmetries, whilst strategic risk comes from 
imperfections in the resource and output markets. 
Normative risk presents itself in the forces that define 





The nature of tactical risk lies with the uncertainty in 
firm’s expected earnings. It is based on the assumption 
that investors are averse to earnings surprises owing to 
information asymmetries. Hence, investors will request 
lower risk premium from firms who can stabilize earnings. 
Firms can employ three strategies to manage tactical risk, 
that is, the use of financial tactics, hedges and real 
options. Chatterjee et al. (1999) pointed out that financial 
tactics include earnings management, governance, and 
liquidity. Chatterjee et al. (1999) cited earnings 
management literature which indicates that the use of 
financial tactics can minimize information asymmetries 
that exist between management and investors. This will 
result in enhancing investors’ ability to forecast earnings.  
The support for the argument of the mentioned firm-
specific actions and risk premium relationship also come 
from governance literature which indicates that investors 
will raise a firm’s risk premium if the firm fails to provide 






The nature of strategic risk is due to the uncertain 
performance outcomes from the firm’s committed 
resources. It is caused mainly by imperfections in 
resource and output markets. Since firms’ survival in the 






strategy in committing and deploying their scarce yet 
precious resources to stay competitive, it follows that 
risks exist if the goal to attain and sustain such 
competitive advantage from the committed resources 
cannot be achieved. Thus strategic risk is defined as the 
chances that a firm can isolate its earnings from 
macroeconomic and industry-specific threats (Chatterjee 
et al., 1999).  
The concept of earnings isolation can find its core in 
strategy literature. Strategy literature provides good 
accounts for various determinants of strategic risk. These 
include the firm-structure view, resource-based view, 
knowledge-based view and strategic options view 
(Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1984). Porter (1980) analyzed 
strategic risk from the firm-structure view. He categorized 
strategic risk in his “five forces” analysis of market rivalry 
and “diamond theory” of national competitive advantage 
(Daniels et al., 2007). Porter’s five forces of market rivalry 
are 1) supplier power, 2) threat of substitutes, 3) degree 
of rivalry, 4) buyer power, and 5) barriers to entry.  
The resource-based view (RBV) of strategic risk argues 
that a firm may keep its resource-based advantages from 
the knowledge of its rivals. This is because valuable 
resources are sometimes intangible and tacit, coupled 
with the fact that their distribution is not homogeneous. 
The nature of these advantages hence, enables a firm to 
keep them invisible from the detection of competitors. As 
a result, it will help cripple competitors’ effort to strategize 
against the firm (Barney, 1991; Connor, 1991).  
Chatterjee et al. (1999) highlighted the knowledge-
based view that the ability of firms to absorb, interpret 
and commercialize critical information on a timely basis is 
asymmetrically distributed. Examples are Intel and 
Microsoft which enjoy low risk premiums because of their 
knowledge advantages on innovation that have enabled 
them to reinvent their product life cycles. This has 
resulted in the creation of asymmetries for future 
advantage which in turn has partially isolated their 
earnings from technological obsolescence.  
The strategic options literature explains that strategic 
options enable firms to create possible avenue for new 
growth and to create the opportunity to redirect strategy 
in the existing business model. Firms undertake strategic 
options in order to mitigate specific sources of 
macroeconomic and industry-specific disturbances risk 
(Chatterjee et al., 1999). Miller (1998) suggested 
acquiring a key supplier to minimize the sensitivity of its 
cash flows to price variability of non-commodity inputs. 
 
 
Normative risk  
 
Chatterjee et al. (1999) argued that any risk premium 
advantages attained through active management of 
tactical and strategic risks will soon be imitated by 
competitors and neutralized due to competitive forces. 
Tactical     and   strategic   actions   will    then    lose    its  




uniqueness and differentiating factor but become 
institutionalized and pre-requisites for firm to stay in the 
industry. Normative risk, thus, is defined as the risk 
premium (or penalty) that a firm is subjected to if it fails to 
comply with its institutional norms or rules that it is 
expected to follow. These norms represent the common 
expectations of the firm’s stakeholders (that is, investors, 
regulators, interest groups) with regards to its behavior 
(Graf, 2004). Firms will be slapped with higher risk 
premium if they fail to observe them. Financial accounting 
literature such as Jones (1996) noted consistent evi-
dence that the incremental information provided by going-
concern audit opinions had an influence on investors’ 
reaction.   
Table 1 summarizes the corresponding definition of the 
three classes of the unsystematic risks and the relevant 
literature from where the argument of their dynamic 
relationships with the firm’s risk premium is derived.    
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
 
Previous research works on corporate risk management 
were mainly concentrated on financial risk management 
and corporate performance (Markides, 1994; Zey and 
Swenson, 2001). Other studies looked at management 
theories to justify and rationalize the practice of risk 
management by the firm (Crouhy et al., 2000). There are 
very few empirical studies examining the impact of an 
enterprise-wide practice of risk management on corpo-
rate performance and value creation with discussion 
beyond financial risk management and much less on the 
examination of value creating transmission mechanism 
for such an enterprise-wide risk management practice. 
The lack of studies in this area is probably due to the fact 
that ERM framework entails managers to engage in 
initiatives which are seen to reduce firm-specific risks. 
Most finance theories such as that of NCFT and CAPM 
posit that all firm-specific activities are irrelevant in 
influencing a firm’s risk premium. Nonetheless, ERM has 
in recent years gained popularity in the corporate scene 
as a robust corporate risk management framework to 
address the many facets of risk facing the firms. As a 
result, ERM has also begun to attract many interests from 
researchers to investigate its efficacy on enterprises’ and 
shareholders’ value creation from its implementation.  
A few areas can be the focus of future research. Firstly, 
exploratory examination onto ERM implementation 
framework and empirical investigation into its value 
creating impact from the perspective of shareholders. 
Data can be collected from public listed companies to test 
hypotheses in relation to ERM’s efficacy on corporate 
value creation such as improved business performance 
and lowered cost of capital. Studies of such nature will 
facilitate the development of a predictive model in antici-
pating ERM successes  through  examining  the  relevant
  




Table 1. Strategic conceptualization of risk premium (CLS model). 
 
Firm-specific risk class Definition Source of risk Relevant literature Risk management objective Action 





To lower the variance of expected 
earnings through minimizing earnings 
surprises/ variation from informational 
asymmetries 
Engage in financial tactics, 


















To isolate earnings from macroeconomic 
and industry-specific disturbances 
Shape market forces in firm’s 
competitive arena to gain 
advantage 




      
Normative 
Incurring risk premium 






advantage view To reduce cost and avoid bearing 
additional risk without the promise of 
higher return  
Comply to industry rules and 
conform to institutionally 





factors of implementation intensity and challenges 
as well as the benefit measures. Secondly, theo-
retical and empirical examination into the value 
creating transmission mechanism for ERM 
implementation. A structural equation model can 
be developed to theorize the connection between 
the various dimensions of ERM implementation 
with a strategic risk premium model like the one 
conceptualized by Chatterjee et al. (1999). 
Reduction of the firm’s risk premium will have a 
direct impact on the firm’s cost of capital. The 
findings of the above research will be significant in 
contributing towards espousing the notion of 
managing the firm’s idiosyncratic risks. They may 
provide strong foundations to further argue and 
research   the   area   of    multi-factor    risk-return  
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